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We show that small switching costs can have surprisingly dramatic eﬀects in inﬁnitely
repeated games if these costs are large relative to payoﬀs in a single period. This shows
that the results in Lipman and Wang [2000] do have analogs in the case of inﬁnitely
repeated games. We also discuss whether the results here or those in Lipman–Wang
[2000] imply a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence with respect to
small switching costs. We conclude that there is not a discontinuity with respect to
switching costs but that the switching costs do create a discontinuity with respect to the
length of a period.1 Introduction
Lipman and Wang [2000] showed that switching costs can have surprisingly strong eﬀects
in frequently but ﬁnitely repeated games. More speciﬁcally, suppose we have a ﬁnite stage
game where the length of each period is ∆ and the total length of time of play is equal
to L =( T +1)∆ for some integer T. Suppose the payoﬀ to player i from the sequence of







where Ii(a,a )=0i fai = a 
i and 1 otherwise.1 In other words, he receives the payoﬀ as-
sociated with each action vector played times the length of time these actions are played,
minus a cost for each time he himself changes actions. We showed some very unexpected
behavior in such games for small ε and ∆ as long as ε is suﬃciently large relative to ∆.
For example, in games like the Prisoners’ Dilemma which have a unique subgame perfect
equilibrium outcome without switching costs, we obtain multiple equilibrium outcomes.
In other games, such as coordination games, which have multiple equilibria without
switching costs, we showed that one can have a unique subgame perfect equilibrium with
small switching costs.
The analysis used ﬁnite repetition in a critical way. We noted that if the switching cost
is large relative to one period worth of payoﬀ, then no player would ﬁnd it worthwhile to
change actions in the last period regardless of what actions were played in the preceding
period. This causes the usual backward induction arguments to break down. The fact
that actions must be ﬁxed at the end can have large eﬀects early in the game.
Here we consider the eﬀect of switching costs in an inﬁnitely repeated game for four
reasons. First, given the way our earlier analysis exploited the ﬁnite horizon, it is not
obvious whether similar eﬀects could be obtained in an inﬁnitely repeated game. Second,
our earlier analysis had the drawback that it was impossible to give many general charac-
terization results. A natural conjecture is that the simplicity of the inﬁnite horizon may
allow us to characterize the set of equilibrium payoﬀs, at least for “suﬃciently patient”
players.
Third, just as with our earlier paper, we seek to explore to what extent the standard
analysis is robust with respect to modiﬁcations of the model which seem “small.” A cost
to changing actions from one period to the next seems natural for at least two reasons.
First, it is a simple way of capturing a type of bounded rationality. Intuitively, it is
easier to continue doing the same thing as in the past than it is to move to some new
course of action. Second, in many economic settings, changing actions requires real costs.
1For simplicity, deﬁne a
−1
i = a0
i for all i.
1For example, entering or exiting a market involves obvious costs. Changing prices often
requires printing new menus or advertising the new prices in some fashion.
A subtle question surrounds when such modiﬁcations of the standard model are
“small.” Most models of dynamic oligopoly ignore menu costs, evidently under the hy-
pothesis that such small costs are irrelevant. However, while the cost of changing prices
presumably is small relative to the present value of the ﬁrm’s proﬁts, these costs may be
quite large relative to a day’s worth of proﬁts. One implication of our analysis is that
the standard Folk Theorem does not hold when costs are large relative to one period’s
worth of payoﬀ, even if they are small relative to the present value of payoﬀs.
Finally, consideration of inﬁnitely repeated games is necessary to determine whether
our earlier results indicate a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence. To
understand this, note that our earlier results indicated that subgame perfect equilibria
with small ε and ∆ are quite diﬀerent from equilibria of ﬁnitely repeated games with
ε = 0. Does this mean that the equilibrium outcome is discontinuous in ε at ε =0 ?T h e
diﬃculty in answering this question comes from the fact that our results all require ε
large relative to ∆. Hence if ε goes to zero, to maintain our results, we must take ∆ to
zero as well. However, we wish to keep the total length of the game ﬁxed. Hence if the
length of a period goes to 0, the number of periods must go to inﬁnity. Hence we are
forced to turn to inﬁnitely repeated games to address the question.
Here we show that diﬀerent but also surprising results are possible with switching
costs in inﬁnitely repeated games if the switching cost is large relative to one period’s
worth of payoﬀ. That is, just as in our earlier analysis, we consider switching costs which
are small in the sense that the cost of one change of action is small relative to total
game payoﬀs that can be earned over the entire horizon. However, in the case of primary
interest, this cost is large relative to the game payoﬀ which can be earned in a single
period. As in our previous work, we parameterize the length of a period and primarily
focus on the case where the length of a period and the switching cost are both small but
the latter is large relative to the former.
To be more precise, consider player i’s payoﬀ to an inﬁnite sequence of action proﬁles
a0,a 1,.... Suppose that, as in the ﬁnite horizon case discussed above, actions are changed
only at intervals of length ∆ and the stage game payoﬀs are ﬂow rates. It seems natural
to view the switching cost as an immediate payment, not a ﬂow cost. Under these














where Ii(a,a )=0i fai = a 
i and 1 otherwise as before2 and r is the (continuous time)

















Note that as the length of a period, ∆, gets small, δ approaches 1. Note that the cost of
one change of action relative to one period worth of payoﬀ is on the order of ε/(1−δ)a n d
so becomes large as ∆ ↓ 0o rδ ↑ 1. On the other hand, the cost of one change of action
relative to all game payoﬀs earned is on the order of ε/[(1 − δ)
 
t δt]=ε. Hence this is
not aﬀected by δ and converges to 0 as ε ↓ 0. Consequently, this formulation enables us
to make the cost of switching large relative to one period worth of payoﬀ while keeping
it small relative to the whole repeated game’s payoﬀs.
By contrast, consider instead a simple variation on the usual discounting formulation,
where we evaluate paths of play by the discounted sum over periods of the payoﬀ in a
period minus a switching cost if incurred in that period. More speciﬁcally, suppose player









This formulation gives no obvious way to shrink the switching cost relative to the whole
repeated game worth of payoﬀ without shrinking it relative to the payoﬀ in a single
period. As before, period length can be thought of as aﬀecting the discount rate δ.
However, here δ aﬀects game payoﬀs and switching costs in the same way. Hence if we
reduce ε,w emust reduce it relative to ui(a) and thus relative to one period worth of
payoﬀ. (As we explain below, there is a sense in which our formulation using equation
(2) nests this alternative as a special case.)
We consider two diﬀerent inﬁnitely repeated games. In the ﬁrst, each player i eval-
uates sequences of actions by the payoﬀ criterion in equation (2). We denote this game
G(ε,δ)w h e r eε ∈ [0,∞)a n dδ ∈ [0,1). The second inﬁnitely repeated game we con-
sider has game payoﬀs deﬁned by the limit of means criterion instead of discounting.
More precisely, we deﬁne the game G∞(ε) to be the game where each player i evaluates








t) − ε#{t | a
t
i  = a
t−1
i }
where # denotes cardinality.3 As we explain in more detail in Section 4, there is a
natural sense in which this game is the limit of our ﬁnitely repeated game as ∆ ↓ 0. Let
3To ensure that this is well–deﬁned, we allow −∞ as a payoﬀ. In other words, we treat payoﬀs in the
repeated game as elements of R ∪{ − ∞ } .
3U(ε,δ) denote the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of G(ε,δ)a n dl e tU∞(ε)d e n o t et h es e to f
equilibrium payoﬀs of G∞(ε).
First, we consider U(ε,δ). In line with the intuition suggested above, our results show
that the set of equilibrium payoﬀs is exactly the usual Folk Theorem set if the switching
cost is small relative to a period worth of payoﬀ but diﬀers from the usual set if the cost
is large relative to one period of payoﬀ. In other words, consider the limit of the set
U(ε,δ)a s( ε,δ) → (0,1). This limit will depend on the particular (ε,δ) sequence chosen.
We show that if we consider sequences such that ε/(1 − δ) → 0, then the limiting set of
payoﬀs is the same as the usual Folk Theorem set. That is, for such sequences, U(ε,δ)
converges to the set of feasible, individually rational payoﬀs. (These limits are deﬁned
more precisely in Section 2.) Note that such sequences can be thought of as including the
formulation in equation (3) as a special case. If we use the payoﬀ criterion in equation (2)
but set ε =ˆ ε(1−δ), we obtain equation (3) with ˆ ε replacing ε.I fw et a k e( ε,δ) → (0,1)
in equation (2) in such a way that ε/(1−δ) → 0, this corresponds to taking (ˆ ε,δ) → (0,1)
in equation (3).
At the opposite extreme, if we consider a sequence such that ε/(1−δ) goes to inﬁnity,
we get a limiting set of payoﬀs which diﬀers from the Folk Theorem set in two ways. First,
the payoﬀ a player can guarantee himself is smaller with switching costs. Intuitively, if a
player needs to randomize to avoid punishment, the expected costs of switching actions
makes this too costly. That is, we must appropriately redeﬁne individual rationality.
Second, the notion of feasibility changes as well since the switching costs can dissipate




the usual Folk Theorem set is all payoﬀ vectors (u1,u 2)w h e r eu1 = u2 and .75 ≤ ui ≤
3. By contrast, if (ε,δ) → (0,1) with ε/(1 − δ) →∞along the sequence, the set of
equilibrium payoﬀs converges to the set of all (u1,u 2) such that (0,0) ≤ (u1,u 2) ≤ (3,3).
Of course, the requirement that ε/(1 − δ) →∞is quite strong. We show that two
results regarding intermediate values of ε/(1 − δ). First, we show that for any of the
payoﬀs we obtain when ε is becoming arbitrarily large relative to 1 − δ, we can approxi-
mately achieve this payoﬀ while keeping ε/(1−δ) bounded. To make the approximation
arbitrarily accurate requires making ε/(1 − δ) arbitrarily large.
We also show that the requirement that ε/(1 − δ) becomes arbitrarily large is driven
entirely by the change in feasibility, not the change in individual rationality. More specif-
ically, if the switching cost is on the order of two periods worth of payoﬀ, then every
feasible (in the traditional sense) and individually rational (in our modiﬁed sense) payoﬀ
4is a limiting equilibrium payoﬀ. Hence even intuitively small switching costs require us
to modify the usual deﬁnition of individual rationality.
As we explain in Section 4, one way to understand these results is to note that if ε is
not arbitrarily small relative to 1 − δ, then there is a sense in which G(ε,δ) is bounded
away from G(0,δ). In other words, when we consider a sequence of (ε,δ) such that
lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
U(ε,δ)  = lim
δ↑1
U(0,δ),
we must also have
lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
G(ε,δ)  = lim
δ↑1
G(0,δ).
(These limits are deﬁned more precisely in Sections 2 and 4.) In this sense, these results
do not indicate a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence with respect
to (ε,δ).
Next, we turn to the case where we use the limit of means to evaluate game payoﬀs.
In this case, the switching cost is larger than the payoﬀs for any ﬁnite number of periods,
so, naturally, we would expect the cost to have the largest eﬀect here. In fact, Theorem 6
shows that both of the two earlier diﬀerences between the equilibrium payoﬀ set and the
usual Folk Theorem set remain and a third is added. This third diﬀerence is strikingly
unusual: payoﬀs that are supported by putting some weight on payoﬀ vectors that are
not individually rational (in the modiﬁed sense appropriate for switching costs) cannot




the usual Folk Theorem set is all feasible payoﬀs where each player gets at least 2. As
ε ↓ 0, the set of equilibrium payoﬀs of G∞(ε) converges to the set of payoﬀs where each
player gets at least 2 and neither gets more than 3. We get this result because in this
game, we cannot put any “weight” on the (4,0) or (0,4) payoﬀ vector. (Payoﬀ vectors
which are not convex combinations of (3,3) and (2,2) are obtained by players dissipating
payoﬀs through the switching costs.) Intuitively, with this formulation, any path of play
in the game must have the property that players change actions only ﬁnitely often with
probability one. Hence any path eventually “absorbs” in the sense that at some point,
actions never change again. It is obvious that we cannot have an equilibrium where the
players know that actions will never change again from (C,D)o r( D,C) since the player
getting 0 will change actions. What is less obvious is why we cannot have some kind of
randomization that “hides” from the players the fact that no further changes of action
will occur. (We do allow the players to condition on public randomizing devices, so we
give the maximum possible ability for the players to use such strategies.) We show that
5players must eventually become sure enough that no change will occur that they will
deviate from any such proposed equilibrium.
Again, this result does not show a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome corre-
spondence with respect to ε. While
lim
ε↓0
U∞(ε)  = U∞(0),
we will show in Section 4 that
lim
ε↓0
G∞(ε)  = G∞(0).
Finally, we use Theorem 6 and results in Lipman–Wang [2000] to address whether our
earlier results demonstrate a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence.
Let Gf(ε,∆) be the game studied in Lipman–Wang [2000] using the payoﬀ function (1)
above and let Uf(ε,∆) denote the set of equilibrium payoﬀs. Analogously to the above,
we show that when
lim
ε↓0,∆↓0






Gf(ε,∆)  = lim
∆↓0
Gf(0,∆).
Thus there is no discontinuity with respect to (ε,∆). On the other hand, as above, there
is in general a discontinuity with respect to ∆ for any ﬁxed ε>0. Speciﬁcally,
lim
∆↓0





The possibility of such a discontinuity with ε = 0 is well known, but the discontinuity
when ε>0 is of a very diﬀerent nature. The known discontinuity for ε = 0 is simply the
diﬀerence between ﬁnitely and inﬁnitely repeated games. However, this discontinuity is
a failure of lower semicontinuity, not upper, as the limiting set of equilibrium payoﬀs is
smaller than the set at the limit. The discontinuity with ε>0 may have the limiting set
larger than the set at the limit. Also, the discontinuity for ε = 0 occurs for a diﬀerent
set of games than the discontinuity for ε>0.
Our results diﬀer from those of Chakrabarti [1990] who considers a similar model.
He analyzes inﬁnitely repeated games with a more general “inertia cost” than we con-
sider. His payoﬀ criterion, however, does not ﬁt into the class we consider. Specializing












the limit of means analog of (3) above. His formulation is a special case of a dynamic
game as considered by Dutta [1995], while our formulation is not. Using the results of
Dutta [1995], one can show that Chakrabarti’s set of equilibrium payoﬀs diﬀers from the
usual Folk Theorem set in two ways, namely the two present in our Theorem 3. That
is, both individual rationality and feasibility must be redeﬁned to take account of the
switching costs.4 However, the third eﬀect we obtain in Theorem 6 is not present. He
does not discuss continuity issues.
In the next section, we state the model. In Section 3, we give our characterizations of
equilibrium payoﬀs. In Section 4, we deﬁne a notion of closeness of games and use this
to consider continuity of the equilibrium outcome correspondence. Proofs not in the text
are contained in the Appendix.
2M o d e l
Fix a ﬁnite stage game G =( A,u)w h e r eA = A1×...×AI,e a c hAi is ﬁnite and contains
at least two elements, and where u : A → RI.L e tSi denote the set of mixed stage game
strategies — that is, Si is the set of randomizations over Ai. We allow the players to
use public randomizing devices, so a strategy for the repeated game can depend on the
history of play as well as the outcome of the public randomization. For simplicity, we
will suppose that there is an iid sequence of random variables, ξt, which are uniformly
distributed on [0,1] which all players observe. A strategy for player i, then, is a function
from the history of past actions and the realization of the randomizations (up to and
including the current period) into Si. That is, it is a function σi : ∪∞
t=0At × [0,1]t → Si
where A0 × [0,1]0 is deﬁned to be the singleton set containing the “empty history” e.
Remark 1 As shown by Fudenberg and Maskin [1991], the use of public randomization
is purely a matter of convenience in the usual repeated game. More speciﬁcally, one can
obtain the same characterization of equilibrium payoﬀs without public randomizations.
However, the assumption is not as innocuous here. While it is not needed for any of the
other results, the result of Theorem 6 is not true in general without public randomization.
The reason is that the equilibrium construction which is typically used to replace public
randomization requires numerous changes of action. Since such changes of action are
4Chakrabarti states his results in a diﬀerent but equivalent way.
7costly in this model, such behavior can be diﬃcult to support as an equilibrium. On
the other hand, the most interesting aspect of Theorem 6 is the payoﬀs which cannot be
achieved. Since allowing public randomization can only increase the set of equilibrium
payoﬀs, this is the most interesting case to consider for that result.
The payoﬀs in the game G(ε,δ), ε ≥ 0, δ ∈ [0,1), are deﬁned as follows. Given a
sequence of actions (a0,a 1,...)w h e r eat =( at
1,...,a t













where Ii(at−1,a t)=1i fa
t−1
i  = at
i and 0 otherwise.5 Let U(ε,δ) denote the closure of the
set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoﬀs in G(ε,δ).
Letting # denote cardinality, we deﬁne the payoﬀ from this sequence in the game










− ε#{t | a
t
i  = a
t−1
i }
if this is a real number and −∞ otherwise. Note that the payoﬀ is a well deﬁned real
number if i changes actions only ﬁnitely often. However, if i changes actions inﬁnitely
often, then the switching cost makes this payoﬀ arbitrarily negative; hence we deﬁne the
payoﬀ to be −∞.L e tU∞(ε) denote the closure of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoﬀs in G∞(ε).
We are interested in the set of U(ε,δ)f o rε very close to 0 and δ very close to 1. As
we will see, this set will depend on the relationship of ε and δ. In addition, we are less
interested in speciﬁc values of ε and δ than in general properties for (ε,δ)n e a r( 0 ,1).
Consequently, it will prove most convenient to consider the set of limit points of U(εn,δ n)
as n →∞for various sequences (εn,δ n).




to be the set of u ∈ RI such that there are sequences εn, δn,a n dun such that
εn > 0,δ n ∈ [0,1), and u








i to be equal to a0
i for any sequence of actions (a0,a 1,...). In other words, there is no
cost of “changing” actions in the ﬁrst period regardless of the action played in that period.
8and (εn,δ n,u n) → (0,1,u)a sn →∞ . Intuitively, then, k is a measure of how large ε is
relative to 1 − δ along the sequence. The case of k = 0 is eﬀectively the situation where
we take ε to zero ﬁrst and then δ to 1; the case of k = ∞ is analogous to the reverse
order of limits.





to be the set of u ∈ RI such that there exist sequences εn and un with
εn > 0a n du
n ∈U ∞(εn), ∀n
with (εn,u n) → (0,u)a sn →∞ .
The usual Folk Theorem sets have ε =0—t h a ti s ,t h e ya r eU∞(0) and limδ↑1 U(0,δ).
We deﬁne the latter analogously to the approach used above. That is, limδ↑1 U(0,δ)i s
the set of u such that there is a sequence δn converging to 1 from below and a sequence
un converging to u with un ∈U(0,δ n) for all n.
Deﬁne i’s reservation payoﬀ, vi,b y









R = {u ∈ R
I | u ≥ v}
denote the usual set of individually rational payoﬀs where v =( v1,...,v I).6 In the
case of two players,7 the classic minmax theorem states that the order of the min-
imization and maximization don’t matter. That is, in this case, vi is also equal to
maxsi∈Si[mins∼i∈S∼i ui(si,s ∼i)]. However, even in the two player case, if i is restricted to
pure strategies, the order matters very much. We will see that the relevant reservation
utility for i in the game with switching costs is what we will call i’s pure reservation
payoﬀ, wi, deﬁned by









W = {u ∈ R
I | u ≥ w}
denote what we will call the set of weakly individually rational payoﬀs, where w =




6Given vectors x and y,w eu s ex ≥ y to mean greater than or equal to in every component and x   y
to mean strictly larger in every component.
7Or if we allow the players other than i to use correlated strategies.
9will be referred to as a maxmin action for i.
It is worth noting for future use, that








To see this, simply note that for any ai ∈ Ai and any j  = i, ui(ai,s ∼i) is linear in j’s
mixed strategy. Hence the value of this expression when minimized over sj is unaﬀected
by restricting j to pure actions. We exploit this fact in what follows.
For any set B ⊆ RI, let conv(B) denote its convex hull. Let U denote the set of
payoﬀs feasible from pure strategies and let F denote the usual set of feasible payoﬀs.
That is,
U = {u ∈ R
I | u = u(a), for some a ∈ A}
and F =c o n v ( U). For comparison purposes, we ﬁrst state the usual Folk Theorem.
We deﬁne a game to be regular if there is u =( u1,...,u I) ∈ F ∩ R such that ui >v i
for all i.
Theorem 1 (The Folk Theorem) F o ra n yr e g u l a rg a m e ,
A. U∞(0) = F ∩ R.




This result is a trivial extension of theorems in Fudenberg and Tirole [1991], Chapter
5, and so we omit the proof.
Remark 2 The restriction to regular games in Theorem 1 is generally not stated but is
often used in some form. For example, one typical version of the Folk Theorem is that
the equilibrium payoﬀ set includes all feasible payoﬀs where each player i receives strictly
more than vi. We use the assumption to be able to give an exact statement of equilibrium
payoﬀ sets without having to consider tedious boundary calculations. The additional
assumption we use in Theorem 1.B is the most simply stated suﬃcient condition. It
could be replaced by the weaker NEU condition of Abreu, Dutta, and Smith [1994].
103R e s u l t s




is the set of limiting equilibrium payoﬀs in G(ε,δ) for sequences (ε,δ)c o n v e r g i n gt o( 0 ,1)
such that ε/(1 − δ) → k. As explained in the introduction, if the switching cost is small
relative to one period worth of payoﬀ, we expect to obtain the same results as in the
usual analysis. That is, we expect the lim
k set to equal the usual Folk Theorem set if k
is small. This intuition is conﬁrmed by
Theorem 2 For any regular game such that F has dimension I,
lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
0 U(εn,δ n)=F ∩ R.
That is, if ε/(1 − δ) goes to 0 along the sequence, the limiting payoﬀ set is the set of
feasible, individually rational payoﬀs.
To see that the limiting set of payoﬀs is contained in F ∩ R, suppose not. First,
suppose that u ∈ lim
0
ε↓0,δ↑1 U(εn,δ n), but u/ ∈ R.L e t( εn,δ n,u n) be the required sequence
converging to (0,1,u)f o rw h i c hun ∈U(εn,δ n)a n dεn/(1−δn) → 0. Fix any i for whom
ui <v i.S i n c eεn/(1 − δn) → 0a n dun
i → ui,i tm u s tb et r u et h a t
u
n
i <v i −
εn
1 − δn
for all n suﬃciently large. But then even if it requires changing actions every period, i can
switch to the strategy of choosing a myopic best reply in every period to the strategies
of the opponents for that period and be better oﬀ, a contradiction.
Next, suppose u ∈ lim
0
ε↓0,δ↑1 U(εn,δ n), but u/ ∈ F. Again, ﬁx the required sequence








where Xn is the expected discounted switching costs in the equilibrium. We know that
Xn must be bounded above by the cost of switching actions in every period so Xn ≤








11Hence u ∈ F.
So we see that
lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
0 U(εn,δ n) ⊆ F ∩ R.
The proof that every payoﬀ in F ∩R is a limiting equilibrium payoﬀ is a simple extension
of arguments in Fudenberg and Tirole and so is omitted.8
As discussed in the introduction, we expect diﬀerences from the standard model when
the switching cost is large relative to one period’s worth of payoﬀ. That is, we expect
lim
k
ε↓0,δ↑1 U(ε,δ) to diﬀer from the usual Folk Theorem set when k is suﬃciently large.
This intuition is conﬁrmed by the next result.
First, we require a few deﬁnitions. Given a set B ⊆ RI,l e tc(B) denote the com-
prehensive, convex hull of B.T h a t i s ,c(B)i st h es e to fp o i n t sl e s st h a no re q u a lt oa
convex combination of points in B. Deﬁne F ∗ = c(U). This is the feasible set of payoﬀs
when we allow players the ability to “throw away” utility.
Deﬁne a game to be weakly regular if there is a payoﬀ vector u =( u1,...,u I) ∈ F
such that ui >w i for all i.S i n c evi ≥ wi, obviously, any regular game is weakly regular.9
While the following result is a corollary to a more general result below, we begin with
it for the sake of clarity.





That is, the limiting payoﬀ set is the set of feasible payoﬀs (taking into account the ability
to dissipate payoﬀs by switching actions) which are weakly individually rational.
Thus we have a simple characterization of equilibrium payoﬀs in the two extreme
cases, where ε/(1−δ) converges to 0 and where it converges to ∞. As one might expect,
the middle ground is more complex. Our next result shows that the transition between
these extremes is gradual in the sense that as k increases, we gradually ﬁll in all the
payoﬀs in F ∗ ∩ W which are not in F ∩ R. More precisely,
8The argument is to note that their proof for the observable mixed strategy case involves strict
payoﬀ comparisons. Hence small enough switching costs cannot aﬀect the optimality of the strategies in
question. Since the public randomization eﬀectively creates observable mixed strategies, this completes
the argument.
9Note that it would be equivalent to deﬁne weak regularity using F ∗ in place of F.
12Theorem 4 For any weakly regular game and any η>0,t h e r ei sakη such that for all
k ≥ kη, for all u ∈ F ∗ ∩ W,t h e r ei sau  within η of u with
u
  ∈ lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
k U(ε,δ).
As η ↓ 0, kη →∞ .
Thus the set of limiting equilibrium payoﬀs when ε/(1−δ) converges to k approximates
F ∗ ∩ W with the precision of the approximation improving as we increase k. However,
to generate the entire set, we need k →∞in general.
A natural question to ask is how large the limiting set of equilibria is for “moderate”
values of k. If the set diﬀers from the usual Folk Theorem set only when k is extremely
large, the interest in Theorems 3 and 4 is somewhat limited. The next result shows that
we only need the switching costs to be on the order of two periods worth of payoﬀ to
generate a very signiﬁcant diﬀerence from the usual Folk Theorem. More speciﬁcally, we
have









F ∩ W ⊆ lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
k U(ε,δ).
That is, all feasible (in the traditional sense) and weakly individually rational payoﬀs are
included in the limiting equilibrium set for “moderate” k.
To understand our interpretation of the condition on k,s u p p o s ew eh a v eas e q u e n c e
(εn,δ n)c o n v e r g i n gt o( 0 ,1) with εn/(1−δn)c o n v e r g i n gt oak satisfying the condition of
Theorem 5. For large n, εn/(1 − δn)i sv e r yc l o s et ok,s o




a∈A ui(a) − wi
 
.
The left–hand side is the cost of a change of actions in the current period. The right–
hand side is approximately the gain in payoﬀ over two periods from moving from wi to
maxa∈A ui(a)f o rs o m ep l a y e ri.A sw ew i l ls e es h o r t l y ,wi is the lowest payoﬀ that can be
imposed on a player, so this payoﬀ gain is, roughly speaking, the large “plausible” payoﬀ
gain to a change in actions. In this sense, this condition says that the switching cost is
bigger than the largest potentially relevant two–period payoﬀ gain.
13The proofs of these results are in the Appendix, but here we sketch the idea. First,
it is obvious that for any k, the limiting payoﬀ set is contained in F ∗ ∩W,s ot h ec r i t i c a l
issue is when these payoﬀs can be generated by some equilibrium.
First, we need to establish that W is the appropriate version of individual rationality.
To see this, consider the payoﬀ a player receives if the others are trying to minimize his
payoﬀ. If the other players continually move to the action which minimizes his payoﬀ
given the action he has most recently played, he will either stop changing actions and
get his pure reservation payoﬀ or change actions every period. If ε/(1 − δ) converges to
a large enough number, these switching costs become too large for this second option to
be optimal. As it turns out, the bound on k given in Theorem 5 is suﬃcient to establish
this. Hence when this condition holds, we can force a player down to his pure reservation
payoﬀ.
To see that F ∗ is the appropriate deﬁnition of feasibility is a little more complex.
Suppose we wish to construct strategies generating a particular payoﬀ vector u in F ∗.





where α is a probability distribution over A and x is a vector of costs. It is tedious
but not diﬃcult to show that for large enough k, any such payoﬀ can be approximately
generated by constructing an appropriate cycle of actions. The cycle is chosen so that the
relative frequencies of actions over the cycle approximates α and the relative frequency
of changes of actions over the cycle generates x. To illustrate the latter, suppose, for
example, that the cycle is of length N and that player i changes actions in the ﬁrst Ni

























⎦ 1 − δ









The second term in the last expression converges to Ni/N as δ → 1. Hence if we take the
limit as (ε,δ) → (0,1) along a sequence for which ε/(1−δ) → k, we see that the switching
costs converge to k(Ni/N). Hence by setting the frequency of i’s action changes over the
cycle appropriately, we can generate whatever switching cost is needed. In short, this
cycle can be chosen so that as (ε,δ) → (0,1), the payoﬀ converges to approximately u,
where the approximation can be made arbitrarily close for large enough k. Thus any
payoﬀ in F ∗ is feasible even in the limit as (ε,δ) → (0,1).
Given these two facts, the completion of the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 is similar to
a standard Folk Theorem construction.
14To explain Theorem 5, we need to ﬁrst clarify why k goes to inﬁnity as our approxi-




It is not hard to see that w1 = w2 = 0. Hence F ∗ ∩ W is the set of (u1,u 2)w i t h
0 ≤ ui ≤ 2f o rb o t hi. Suppose we want to generate the payoﬀ (1,2). The way we do this
is to construct a cycle. More speciﬁcally, player 2 always plays R. In the cycle, player
1 changes actions N1 times, then the players play (U,R) N2 times. The frequency of
play of the “wrong” action, (D,R), is approximately (1/2)N1/(N1 + N2). As explained
above, player 1’s switching cost converges as (ε,δ) → (0,1) to kN1/(N1 + N2). We need
to choose N1 and N2 so that the frequency of (D,R) is close to 0 and so that player 1’s
switching cost over the cycle is close to 1. The former requires us to make N1/N2 very
close to zero. Given this, the latter requires k very large. In particular, the closer we
wish to approximate the payoﬀ (1,2), the larger k will have to be. Hence k →∞as
η ↓ 0.
On the other hand, this problem arises only when we want to construct certain payoﬀs
in F ∗ which are not in F.I fap a y o ﬀi si nF, we do not need the initial switching phase
to dissipate payoﬀs. In fact, for any k, we can ﬁnd a cycle which approximately generates
any payoﬀ u ∈ F arbitrarily well. This fact together with the observation above that
the condition in Theorem 5 is suﬃcient to make w the relevant notion of individual
rationality explains why Theorem 5 holds.
We obtain a more unusual characterization in the case of the limit of U∞(ε)a sε ↓ 0.
Let U≥ denote those points in U which are greater than w.T h a ti s ,
U≥ = {u =( u1,...,u I) ∈ U | ui ≥ wi, ∀i}.
For the next result, we need one additional assumption which we call rewardability.W e
say that a game satisﬁes rewardability if there is a payoﬀ vector u =( u1,...,u I) ∈ U≥
with ui >w i for all i. It is worth emphasizing that this property is much stronger than
regularity.
To see the idea behind the name, suppose this assumption does not hold. As men-
tioned in the introduction, in G∞(ε), the only u vectors which can be achieved inﬁnitely
often with positive probability are those in U≥.I ff o rs o m ep l a y e ri, all these vectors give
him wi, then he cannot be rewarded for aiding in the punishment of a deviator. This
complication restricts the set of equilibria in a complex fashion as we explain in more
detail below.




To see how this diﬀers from the payoﬀ set from Theorem 3, note that we can write
that set as c(U)∩W. In this form, the diﬀerence is obvious: the payoﬀ set of Theorem 6
only puts weight on payoﬀs which are weakly individually rational, not all pure strategies.
The proof that any payoﬀ in c(U≥) ∩ W is a limiting equilibrium payoﬀ is similar to
standard Folk Theorem arguments. The more unusual part of the proof is the demon-
stration that no payoﬀ outside this set can be close to an equilibrium payoﬀ. We sketch




Let P(C,C) denote the set of inﬁnite sequences of actions which eventually “absorb”
at (C,C) — that is, sequences with the property that for some T, the actions played
at any t ≥ T are (C,C). Deﬁne P(C,D), etc., analogously. Note that any sequence of
actions which is not in P(C,C), P(C,D), P(D,C), or P(D,D) has at least one player
changing actions inﬁnitely often. If any player has a positive probability of switching
actions inﬁnitely often, his expected payoﬀ is −∞ and so his strategy cannot be optimal.
Hence any equilibrium has to put zero probability on such an event. That is, the sets
P(C,C), P(C,D), P(D,C), and P(D,D) must have probability 1 in total. The main
claim of Theorem 6 is that the sets P(C,D)a n dP(D,C) must have zero probability in
equilibrium.
To see this, suppose, say, P(C,D) has probability µ>0. Clearly, it cannot have
probability 1. If it did, player 1’s payoﬀ in equilibrium would be 0, while playing a
constant action of D gives him a payoﬀ of 2, a contradiction. Clearly, too, there can be
no history with the property that the probability of P(C,D) conditional on this history
is 1. If it were, then for any switching cost less than 2, player 1 could proﬁtably deviate
on that history to a constant action of D and be better oﬀ.
What is not so transparent is whether it is possible to construct the public random-
izations in such a way that play does absorb at (C,D) but this fact is hidden from player
1. In other words, can we construct strategies with the property that there is a positive
probability that (C,D) is played from a certain point onward and yet along this path of
play, player 1 always believes there is a nontrivial probability that some other action will
be played in the future?
In fact, the answer to this question is no. To see this, suppose (C,D)i sp l a y e da t
period t and consider the probability player 1 gives to the event P(C,D) conditional
16on this fact. Clearly, any path of play which absorbs at a diﬀerent action proﬁle at a
period before t must have zero probability at this point. Hence for large t, the conditional
probability that the play path is P(C,C), P(D,C), or P(D,D) must be getting small.
At the same time, this fact that (C,D)i sp l a y e da tt cannot rule out the possibility that
play has already absorbed at (C,D). Hence as t gets large, the conditional probability
on P(C,D) must converge to 1. But once this conditional probability is large enough,
player 1 will certainly deviate to D, a contradiction. Note that this argument actually
implies that we cannot have a Nash equilibrium putting positive probability on P(C,D),
much less a subgame perfect equilibrium.





It is not hard to see that w1 = w2 =0s oU≥ = {(0,1)}. Hence rewardability fails because
the only vector in U≥ gives player 1 his pure reservation payoﬀ. For this game,
c(U≥) ∩ W = {(0,x) | 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}.
However, the unique equilibrium payoﬀ is (0,1). Intuitively, this is because player 1 must
get a payoﬀ of 0 in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Hence he cannot be induced to
change actions and so will not punish 2 for deviations. Hence 2 must receive a payoﬀ of
1. It is not hard to see how one could give a characterization of the limiting equilibrium
set without rewardability. Analogously to Wen [1994], one can explicitly work out the
way in which punishment is constrained to give an exact characterization of the limiting
equilibrium set. More speciﬁcally, if for some player i, every vector in U≥ gives him a
payoﬀ of wi, then he will must play a ﬁxed action at every history of every equilibrium.
We can set this player to the constant action he must play and solve the “reduced game”
among the remaining players, iterating this procedure as necessary.
Remark 4 It is worth noting that the proof of Theorem 6 also shows that the reduction
in the set of payoﬀs is not entirely a “vanishing ε” phenomenon. More speciﬁcally, the
proof shows that there is a ¯ ε>0 such that for all ε ∈ (0, ¯ ε), U∞(ε) is contained in
c(U≥) ∩ W.
It is natural to wonder why we get such a dramatic diﬀerence between the discounting
and limit of means cases. This is much more than the dimensionality issue that comes up
in the analysis of repeated games without switching costs. The diﬀerence here hinges, as
with most of our results, on the relationship between the switching cost and the length of
17a period. To see the point, consider the discounting case and suppose we take the limit
of U(ε,δ)a s( ε,δ) → (0,1) along a sequence where ε/(1 − δ) →∞ .A s a r g u e d a b o v e ,
we can think of this as making the period length short relative to the switching cost.
However, this eﬀect can be undone in equilibrium. To see the point, note that we could
always construct equilibria in which the players act as if a block of k periods was only
one period. That is, they only change actions at intervals of k periods.10 By constructing
such equilibria, we can eﬀectively make the length of a period arbitrarily long relative to
the switching cost.
For any δ<1, this matters. However, in the limit of means case, it does not. In
G∞(ε), only the number of times the players change actions matters, not the intervals
at which these changes occur. Hence this is the only situation where the players cannot
endogenously alter the relationship between switching costs and payoﬀs in “a period.”
4C o n t i n u i t y
To say whether our results indicate a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspon-
dence, we must ﬁrst deﬁne a notion of convergence of games. We say that a sequence of
games Gn converges to a game G if for every player and every sequence of action proﬁles,
the payoﬀ in Gn converges as n →∞to the payoﬀ in G. That is, we say that
lim
n→∞G(εn,δ n)=G(ε,δ)































We deﬁne convergence to G∞(ε) or convergence of the sequence G∞(εn) analogously. We
emphasize that we allow convergence of a payoﬀ to −∞ in this deﬁnition. That is, we
deﬁne the limit of a monotonically decreasing sequence with no lower bound as −∞.I n
particular, any sequence of actions where some player changes actions every period will
have a payoﬀ of −∞ for that player in G∞(ε). Hence if some sequence of games is to
converge to G∞(ε), we must allow a sequence of payoﬀs to converge to −∞.11
10Of course, one cannot prevent players from deviating from this and changing actions more frequently.
However, the punishment for deviations can also come more quickly as well.
11Because of this, our deﬁnition of convergence of a sequence of games is not the same as that gener-
ated by deﬁning the distance between two games to be the supremum payoﬀ diﬀerence over players and
sequences of action proﬁles. In particular, Lemma 3 below would not hold under this alternative deﬁni-
tion. To see this, note that every payoﬀ in Gf(ε,∆) is ﬁnite. Fix any sequence of actions where player
i changes actions inﬁnitely often. Then the diﬀerence in the payoﬀs to i from this sequence between
Gf(ε,∆) and G∞(ε)i s∞ for every ε>0a n d∆> 0. Hence as ∆ → 0, the distance between Gf(ε,∆)
and G∞(ε) according to this deﬁnition does not go to zero.
18Using this, we have
Lemma 1 For any sequence (εn,δ n), we have
lim
n→∞G(εn,δ n) = lim
n→∞G(0,δ n)
if and only if εn/(1 − δn) → 0.
Proof. Fix any i and any sequence of actions a0,a 1,... where i changes actions every
period. Note that the payoﬀ to i from this sequence in G(0,δ n) is bounded between
mina∈A ui(a)a n dm a x a∈A ui(a). Hence as n →∞ , the payoﬀ cannot converge to −∞.
Hence if the payoﬀ in G(0,δ n) has the same limit as n →∞as the payoﬀ in G(εn,δ n),
the latter must also be ﬁnite, so the diﬀerence in payoﬀs must converge to 0 as n →∞ .









Hence if εn/(1 − δn)  → 0, G(εn,δ n)a n dG(0,δ n) cannot have the same limit.
For the converse, ﬁx any i and any sequence of actions a0,a 1,..., not necessarily one












Hence if εn/(1 − δn) → 0, G(εn,δ n)a n dG(0,δ n) do have the same limit.
Given this result, we see that Theorems 3, 4, and 5 do not indicate a discontinuity at
(ε,δ)=( 0 ,1) in the equilibrium outcome correspondence. In particular, in the class of
games considered, the limiting set of payoﬀs in G(εn,δ n)a n dG(0,δ n)a sn →∞diﬀer
only if the limiting games diﬀer.
That Theorem 6 does not imply a discontinuity at ε = 0 is a corollary to
Lemma 2 Fix any strictly positive sequence εn.T h e n
lim
n→∞G∞(εn)  = G∞(0).
Proof. Fix any i and any sequence of actions where i changes actions inﬁnitely often. i’s
payoﬀ in G∞(εn)i s−∞ for every n, while his payoﬀ in G∞(0) is bounded from below
by mina∈A ui(a). Hence i’s payoﬀ in G∞(εn) does not converge to his payoﬀ in G∞(0) as
n →∞ .
19Remark 5 It is common to describe the inﬁnitely repeated game with the limit of means
criterion as the limit of the game with discounting as δ → 1. Our deﬁnition of convergence
does not support this view. The reason is simply that, as is well–known, there are
sequences of action proﬁles for which the limiting average payoﬀ does not exist and the
liminf of the average payoﬀ is not equal the limiting discounting payoﬀ as δ → 1. On
the other hand, if we deﬁne the limit of means game to be the limit as δ → 1o fG(ε,δ),




U(ˆ ε,δ)  = U∞(ˆ ε).









and these sets are far apart in general. So if we deﬁne the limit as δ → 1 of the discounted
game as the limit of means game, this result says that there is a discontinuity at δ =1 .I t
is well–known that there are stage games for which limδ↑1 U(0,δ)  = U∞(0). However, the
discontinuity for ε>0 diﬀers from the known discontinuity for ε = 0 in two ways. First,
the known discontinuity is ruled out by fairly weak conditions such as the dimensionality
condition we used in Theorem 1.B. The discontinuity for ε>0i sn o tr u l e do u tb y
such conditions. Second, the known discontinuity is a failure of lower semicontinuity,
not upper. That is, the usual discontinuity occurs when U∞(0) is strictly larger than
limδ↑1 U(0,1). Under very weak conditions, U∞(0) equals F ∩R and it is always true that
U(0,δ) ⊆ F ∩ R. Hence we typically get upper semicontinuity in δ at (ε,δ)=( 0 ,1). By
contrast, when the discontinuity in δ for ﬁxed ε>0 occurs, it is because U∞(ε)i sc l o s e
to a set which is strictly smaller than a set close to limδ↑1 U(ε,δ). Hence we generally
violate upper semicontinuity.
Finally, we can use the results here to determine whether the results in Lipman–Wang
[2000] indicate a discontinuity in the equilibrium outcome correspondence. To do so, we
embed our previous model into this class of games in order to deﬁne convergence of that
model. To be more precise, let Gf(ε,∆) denote the inﬁnitely repeated stage game where





t) − ε#{t ≤ T(∆) | a
t




where T(∆) is the largest integer satisfying (T +1)∆≤L . (Recall that the length of time
the game is played is equal to L.) In other words, while the game is inﬁnitely repeated,
20only actions played in the ﬁrst T(∆) + 1 periods matter.12 Given this, we can deﬁne
convergence of a sequence of such games just as before. In particular, it is easy to show
that
Lemma 3 For any ε>0 and any sequence ∆n with ∆n > 0 and converging to 0,
lim
n→∞Gf(ε,∆n)=G∞(ε).
On the other hand, analogously to Lemma 1, we have




if and only if εn/∆n → 0.
Proof. Fix any i and any sequence of action proﬁles where i changes actions every period.
Since i’s payoﬀ in Gf(0,∆n) is bounded from below by mina∈A ui(a), the limit of his payoﬀ
as n →∞must be ﬁnite. Hence if the payoﬀ in Gf(0,∆n) has the same limit as n →∞
as the payoﬀ in Gf(εn,∆n), the latter must also be ﬁnite, so the diﬀerence in payoﬀs
must converge to 0 as n →∞ . Note that the payoﬀ to i in Gf(0,∆n)m i n u st h ep a y o ﬀ







By deﬁnition of T(∆n)a n dt h ef a c tt h a t∆ n → 0, we must have limn→∞ ∆nT(∆n)=M.
Hence limn→∞ εnT(∆n) = 0 iﬀ limn→∞ εn/∆n =0 .S oi fGf(εn,∆n)a n dGf(0,∆n)h a v e
the same limit, it must be true that εn/∆n → 0.
For the converse, ﬁx any i and any sequence of actions a0,a 1,..., not necessarily one
where i changes actions every period. Then the payoﬀ in G(0,∆n) minus the payoﬀ in
G(εn,∆n)i s
εn#{t ≤ T(∆) | a
t
i  = a
t−1
i }≤εnT(∆n).
If εn/∆n → 0, then εnT(∆n) → 0, so the payoﬀ diﬀerence goes to zero. Hence if
ε/∆n → 0, Gf(εn,∆n)a n dGf(0,∆n) do have the same limit.
12This method of embedding a ﬁnitely repeated game into the inﬁnitely repeated one is similar to
that used by Fudenberg and Levine [1983]. They used a ﬁxed action after some period, an approach less
convenient for our purposes.
21Just as with G(ε,δ), this result implies that there is no discontinuity in ε. As discussed
in Lipman–Wang [2000], Gf(ε,∆) yields diﬀerent results from the usual ﬁnitely repeated
game only when ∆ <K εfor some K>0. In particular, if ε/∆ is small, the switching
costs do not change the usual results. In other words, when Uf(ε,∆) for small ε is
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from Uf(0,∆ ) ,i tm u s tb et r u et h a t∆i ss m a l lr e l a t i v et oε and so
Gf(ε,∆) is far from Gf(0,∆). Hence there is no discontinuity in ε at ε =0 .
On the other hand, for any strictly positive ε, in general, Uf(ε,∆) is discontinuous





As we noted, for any ε>0 but small, it is impossible to sustain an equilibrium in G∞(ε)
which puts positive weight on (0,4) or (4,0). Hence the set of equilibrium payoﬀs is a
subset of the (u1,u 2) such that 2 ≤ ui ≤ 3f o rb o t hi. On the other hand, it is easy to
use Theorem 1 of Lipman–Wang [2000] to construct equilibrium payoﬀs outside this set
for Gf(ε,∆) as ∆ ↓ 0.13
This implies that for ε suﬃciently small,
lim
∆↓0





by Lemma 3. Hence we have a discontinuity in ∆ at ∆ = 0 for any suﬃciently small
ε>0.
For the case of ε = 0, there is already a well–known discontinuity as ∆ ↓ 0. Recall that
Gf(0,∆) is just the usual ﬁnitely repeated game where T(∆) is the number of repetitions
and G∞(0) is the usual inﬁnitely repeated game with the limit of means payoﬀ criterion.
So the well–known diﬀerence between ﬁnitely repeated and inﬁnitely repeated games
corresponds to a discontinuity in the equilibrium payoﬀ correspondence at ∆ = 0.
There are two ways to see that the discontinuity in ∆ for ε>0 is fundamentally
diﬀerent from the known discontinuity for ε = 0. First, the known discontinuity is a
13More speciﬁcally, Theorem 1 of Lipman–Wang implies that for this game, there is a K>0 such that
for all suﬃciently small ε and all ∆ ∈ (0,Kε), there is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Gf(ε,∆) where
both players cooperate in every period. Given this, we can construct an equilibrium which begins with
(C,D) played for some number of periods, followed by (C,C) for the rest of the game with play moving
to (D,D) in the event of deviation. As long as the fraction of the time spent at (C,D) is small enough
that player 1 gets a payoﬀ of at least 2, this will be a subgame perfect equilibrium. In particular, then,
the fraction of time spent at (C,D) does not have to converge to 0 as ∆ ↓ 0.
22failure of lower semicontinuity, not upper. That is, in the known discontinuity, the set of
equilibrium payoﬀs at the limit is larger than the limiting set. Above, we showed that
the limiting set of equilibrium payoﬀs contains points not in the set at the limit. Hence
the discontinuity when ε>0 shows a failure of upper semicontinuity, not lower.
Second, the discontinuity for ε>0 occurs in some games where there is no disconti-




This game has no discontinuity in ∆ at ε = 0 since it satisﬁes the Benoit–Krishna
[1985] conditions for a ﬁnite repetition Folk Theorem. On the other hand, Theorem 4 of




while Theorem 6 above shows that U∞(ε) is close to the set of all (u1,u 2)w i t h1≤ ui ≤ 4,
i =1 ,2. Hence there is a discontinuity in ∆ for ε small but positive. Note that this is
a failure of lower semicontinuity, so the equilibrium outcome correspondence Uf(ε,∆) is
neither upper nor lower semicontinuous in ∆ at ∆ = 0 and ε>0.
23A Proof of Theorem 4
It is obvious that no u/ ∈ F ∗ ∩ W can be an equilibrium payoﬀ. Such a u is either
infeasible or has some player with a lower payoﬀ than what he could guarantee himself
by a constant action. Hence we only need to show that all payoﬀs in F ∗∩W can be close
to equilibrium payoﬀs for k suﬃciently large.
We begin by showing that every such payoﬀ can be approximately generated by a
cycle of actions.
Lemma 5 Fix any η>0. Then there exists ¯ k such that for all u =( u1,...,u I) ∈
F ∗ ∩W and all k ≥ ¯ k, there is a ﬁnite cycle of action proﬁles such that for any sequence
(εn,δ n) → (0,1) with εn/(1 − δn) → k,t h ep a y o ﬀt oi along this sequence converges as
n →∞to within η of ui.
Proof. Fix η>0. For each i,l e t
di =m a x
a∈A ui(a) − wi.
















Let ¯ k = BC
 
i di + 1. Obviously, C, B, and therefore ¯ k converge to inﬁnity as η ↓ 0.
Fix any k ≥ ¯ k.
Fix any u ∈ F ∗ ∩ W.S i n c eu ∈ F ∗, there exists a probability distribution α over A





Also, u ∈ W,s o
max
a∈A ui(a) − xi ≥
 
a∈A
α(a)ui(a) − xi ≥ wi.
By deﬁnition of di, then, xi ≤ di.
Obviously, we can approximately α arbitrarily closely by a probability distribution ˆ α
with the property that ˆ α(a) is a strictly positive rational number for all a ∈ A.W h a tw e
24show now is that this can be done in such a way that the C deﬁned above is a common
denominator for these probabilities, even though C is deﬁned independently of u or α.
To see this, ﬁrst, ﬁx any a∗ which maximizes α(a). Note that α(a∗) ≥ 1/A. For every
a  = a∗,l e tca denote the unique integer such that
c
a − 1 ≤ Cα(a) <c
a.
Note that this ensures that ca ≥ 1f o ra  = a∗.L e t ca∗ = C −
 
a =a∗ ca.T o s e e t h a t
ca∗


























≥ 1i fCα(a∗) −A+1≥ 1o rC ≥A /α(a∗). Since α(a∗) ≥ 1/A,w eh a v e
A2 ≥A /α(a∗). The choice of C ensures that C ≥A 2,s oC ≥A /α(a∗)a sr e q u i r e d .
Consider  
   










   
   .
Given the speciﬁcation of the ca’s, the weight on each a in
 
a(ca/C)ui(a)d i ﬀ e r sf r o m
the weight in
 
a α(a)ui(a)b yl e s st h a n1 /C. The worst possible eﬀect this could have is
if A−1p o i n t sg i v ei payoﬀ maxa∈A ui(a), the remaining action vector gives mina∈A ui(a),
and we shift 1/C from each of the ﬁrst A−1 action vectors to the last one. In this case,
we lower i’s payoﬀ by (A−1)/C times maxa∈A ui(a) − mina∈A ui(a). Hence
max
i
   
 









   
 
































   
 














25For the next step, deﬁne X =
 





Because B ≥ 1, the fact that k>B C
 
i di implies k>C
 
i di.B u t di ≥ xi,s ot h i s
implies k>C X . Hence L ≥ 1.






















<N i +1 .
Clearly, Ni ≥ 0 for all i. Deﬁne NI = N −
 
i =I Ni.T os e et h a tNI ≥ 0, note that the






























Hence NI ≥ 0i f
X − xI ≤
k
LC
or X − (k/LC) ≤ xI. From the deﬁnition of L, however, X ≤ k/LC,s oxI ≥ 0 implies
that this holds.








   




   




For i = I, we have a more complicated bound. Summing equation (4) over i  = I yields
(N − NI)k
LCN
≤ X − xI ≤

















26From the deﬁnition of L,
k















































Since I ≥ 2, the bound we have for our error on I must exceed the bound for any i  = I.




















Note that the right–hand side is strictly decreasing in L. By deﬁnition, L>(k/CX)−1.
Hence for all i
 









































Recall that X ≤
 























By construction, k>B C
 






































By our choice of N, this holds. Hence
 
   






















We are now ready to construct the cycle of actions. After doing so, we use the facts
established above to characterize the limiting payoﬀs along the cycle.
First, we have a switching phase. We begin at an arbitrary action vector a0.T h e n
player 1 changes actions back and forth N1 times. Let a1 denote the vector created when
he changes actions. After this, depending on whether N1 is even or odd, we are at either
a0 or a1. At this point, player 2 changes actions N2 times. Let a2 denote the vector
created when 2 changes. Continue similarly to construct action proﬁles a3,...,a I.A f t e r
player I carries out his NI s w i t c h e s ,w em o v eo nt ot h epayoﬀ phase. Fix any order of
action proﬁles in A. In the payoﬀ phase, the action proﬁles are played in this ﬁxed order.
When it is proﬁle a’s turn to be played, it is played caLN times minus the number of
times it was played (if at all) in the switching phase. Note that a given action proﬁle
must be played strictly fewer than N times in the switching phase (since this is the length
of the phase). Hence caLN minus the number of times a proﬁle is played in the switching
phase must be strictly positive since ca ≥ 1 for every a ∈ A and L ≥ 1. After the last
action has its turn in the payoﬀ phase, the cycle starts over.
Note that the total length of the cycle is
 
a caLN = CLN.P r o ﬁ l ea is played exactly
caLN times over the course of the cycle, so the frequency with which it is played is ca/C.
How many times does player i change actions over the course of the cycle? By
construction, he changes exactly Ni times in the switching phase. We cannot say how
many times he changes in the payoﬀ phase, but we know that it cannot be more times
that the number of action proﬁles. Call Zi the number of times i changes in the switching
phase and recall that A is the number of action proﬁles. So Zi ≤A .
Fix any sequence (εn,δ n)c o n v e r g i n gt o( 0 ,1) with εn/(1 − δn)c o n v e r g i n gt ok.I ti s
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As noted in the proof of Lemma 5, ¯ k →∞as η ↓ 0, so obviously kη →∞as well.
Fix any k ≥ kη and any ¯ u ∈ F ∗ ∩ W. We will show that there is a u within η of ¯ u
such that u ∈ lim
k U(ε,δ).
First, we show that without loss of generality, we can assume that ¯ ui >w i for all i.
To see this, recall that the game is weakly regular. By deﬁnition, then, there is a u  ∈ F
(and hence in F ∗) such that u 
i >w i for all i.L e t¯ u  = λ¯ u+(1−λ)u  for λ ∈ (0,1). Since
F ∗ is convex, this must be contained in F ∗. Clearly, by making λ large enough, we can
make ¯ u  arbitrarily close to ¯ u. Also, since ¯ ui ≥ wi and u 
i >w i,w eh a v e¯ u 
i >w i for all i.
Hence if ¯ ui = wi for some i, we can replace ¯ u with ¯ u .
Fix any sequence (εn,δ n)c o n v e r g i n gt o( 0 ,1) with εn/(1 − δn) → k. By Lemma 5,
there is a ﬁnite cycle of actions, independent of n, which generates a payoﬀ vector, say un,
such that limn→∞ un is within η of ¯ u.L e tu denote this limit. By taking η<mini ¯ ui−wi,
we can ensure that ui >w i for all i.
An important observation which we use repeatedly below is that i’s continuation
payoﬀ at any point in this sequence of actions converges as n →∞to ui.T h a t i s ,
suppose that we consider i’s payoﬀ from some point within the cycle onward. Suppose
that   periods remain in the current cycle. Because the cycle is ﬁnite,   is bounded. Then
i’s continuation payoﬀ from this point forward must be at least





   
(1 − δn)min





and must be less than










29Both of these expressions converge as n →∞to ui.
We now show that every suﬃciently large n, there is a subgame perfect equilibrium
with an equilibrium path equal to this cycle of actions. The subgame perfect equilibrium
strategies are independent of n. Fix any payoﬀ vectors ˆ u1,...,ˆ uI ∈ F ∗ ∩ W such that
ˆ u
j
i >w i, ∀i,j
ˆ u
i
i <u i, ∀i
ˆ u
i
i < ˆ u
j
i, ∀i,j.
It is not hard to see that such ˆ uj’s must exist since F ∗ is full dimensional. For example,
we could set ˆ uj equal to u minus a small amount for player j.F o r e a c hˆ uj,t h e r ei sa
ﬁnite cycle such that the payoﬀs along the sequence converges as n →∞to within η of
ˆ uj. Without loss of generality, we can assume, in fact, that for each ˆ uj, there is a ﬁnite
cycle such that payoﬀs along the sequence converge as n →∞to exactly ˆ uj.I fn o t ,w e
can simply replace ˆ uj with the limiting payoﬀ along this sequence. For η small enough,
these limiting payoﬀs will satisfy the required properties.14
The strategies are similar to those used by Fudenberg and Tirole [1991] in their proof
of their Theorem 5.4. Play begins in phase I. In phase I, the players follow the cycle
of actions generating the payoﬀ near u. As long as no player deviates, all follow these
actions. If there is a unilateral deviation by player i in phase I, we move to phase IIi.I n
this phase, i plays any one of his maxmin actions for Mi periods (Mi characterized below).
In each period of phase IIi, all players other than i play some vector of actions which
minimizes i’s payoﬀ against his action in the preceding period. (Given that i follows
his equilibrium strategy in this phase, these actions which be those which minimize i’s
payoﬀ from his chosen maxmin action from the second period of phase IIi onward.) At
the end of these Mi periods, we move to phase IIIi. In this phase, the players follow the
cycle of actions which generates payoﬀs ˆ ui.I f p l a y e r j, j  = i, unilaterally deviates in
phase IIi or IIIi, we move to phase IIj a n dt h e nI I I j.I fp l a y e ri unilaterally deviates in
phase IIi, we restart the phase. We treat unilateral deviations by player i in phase IIIi
slightly diﬀerently. In this case, we move to phase IIi as above, but afterward move back
to where we left oﬀ in phase IIIi rather than beginning that phase again. That is, if in
the kth period of the cycle generating payoﬀ ˆ ui,p l a y e ri deviates, then when we have
completed phase IIi, we return to the action proﬁle that was supposed to be played in
the kth period of the cycle and continue from there. We assign an arbitrary subgame
perfect continuation if there are multiple simultaneous deviations in any phase.
14To be more precise, suppose we choose the ˆ uj’s so that the payoﬀ diﬀerences stated above at all
at least γ where γ>2η. Given this, we can use the limiting payoﬀs and know that they satisfy the
inequalities stated above.












Obviously, the fact that ˆ ui
i >w i implies that such an M exists.
To show that these strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium, we show that there
is a ﬁnite set of inequalities, each of which holds for n suﬃciently large, which ensure
that no player has a proﬁtable deviation on any history. Since there are only ﬁnitely
many inequalities involved, we know that there is a ﬁnite ¯ n such that for all larger n,a l l
inequalities hold. Hence for n ≥ ¯ n, these strategies form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
So consider any history such that the players are in phase I. Suppose there are  
periods left in the current cycle. As argued above, player i’s continuation payoﬀ from
following the equilibrium strategy converges as n →∞to ui.I f i deviates, his payoﬀ
in the period of deviation certainly cannot be larger than maxa∈A ui(a). Given that i
follows the equilibrium strategies after the period of deviation, his payoﬀ from deviating
















To understand this calculation, recall that in the ﬁrst period of the punishment, i will
play one of his maxmin actions, but the other players will be choosing actions which max-
imize his payoﬀ against his previous action, not his current action. In general, therefore,
the payoﬀ he earns in this period will not be wi. Obviously, though, it cannot exceed
maxa∈A ui(a). Also, this calculation presumes that i will not incur any switching costs
during the punishment and will not have to change actions to begin phase IIIi. Clearly,
then, this is an upper bound on i’s payoﬀ to deviating. As n →∞ , this payoﬀ converges
to ˆ ui
i. By assumption ui > ˆ ui
i, so for all n suﬃciently large, i does not gain by deviating
in phase I. Note that this argument implicitly considers ﬁnitely many inequalities since
we certainly do not need more than one inequality for each player, each of his ﬁnitely
many possible deviation actions, and each of the ﬁnitely many periods of the cycle in
which he might deviate.
So consider any history such that the players are in phase IIi. Recall that where we
go from here depends on how this phase was reached. In particular, if we were in the
middle of a cycle in phase IIIi and player i deviated, then after completing this phase,
we pick up from where we left oﬀ the cycle. Let ˆ uj(n)d e n o t ej’s continuation payoﬀ
from the end of this phase onward. If we entered phase IIi in any fashion other than a
deviation from i in the middle of IIIi, then this is ˆ ui
j; otherwise, it a little more complex
but the distinction will not be important for this part of the proof. The only important
fact to note is that as n →∞ ,ˆ uj(n) → ˆ ui
j for all j.
31First consider player i. Suppose we are at the beginning of the phase IIi and that
i must change actions to reach a maxmin action. Then if he follows the equilibrium
strategies from this point, his payoﬀ will be at least







n ˆ ui(n). (8)
To understand this, recall that in the ﬁrst period of punishment, he will be playing one
of his maxmin actions, but the other players will be choosing actions which might not
minimize his payoﬀ given that action. Hence his payoﬀ in that period must be at least
wi. Of course, in the remainder of the phase, his payoﬀ will be exactly wi each period.
For the deviation payoﬀ, consider two cases. First, suppose the deviation involves not
changing actions in the ﬁrst period. Recall that the other players are choosing actions
which minimize i’s payoﬀ to his previous period’s action. Hence the payoﬀ i earns in the
period of deviation must be less than wi. After this, following the equilibrium strategies
must earn exactly the same payoﬀ as he would have gotten had he followed them from the
outset. That is, if ei is i’s payoﬀ to following the equilibrium, then his payoﬀ to deviating
by not changing actions and then following the equilibrium thereafter is no more than
wi(1−δn)+δnei. Clearly, i is better oﬀ following the equilibrium if ei ≥ wi(1 = δn)+δnei or
ei ≥ wi. The lower bound above for i’s continuation payoﬀ from following the equilibrium
converges to ˆ ui
i as n →∞ .S i n c eˆ ui
i >w i, we know that ei >w i for all n suﬃciently
large.
Next, suppose the deviation involves changing actions but to some action other than
one of the maxmin actions. In this case, the payoﬀ to deviating and then following the
equilibrium strategies cannot exceed
−εn(1 + δn)+( 1− δn)(1 + δn)max







n ˆ ui(n). (9)
Hence the deviation is not proﬁtable if the expression in (8) exceeds the above or
δnεn+(1−δn)(1+δn)wi+δ
Mi










+( 1+δn)wi + δ
Mi




Note that this holds in the limit as n →∞if





i >w i, a suﬃcient condition is k>2[maxa∈A ui(a) − wi] which holds by our
assumption on k. Hence for n suﬃciently large, again, the deviation is not proﬁtable.
32Now suppose that that there are   periods left to the punishment phase,   ≤ Mi,a n d
that i played a maxmin action in the preceeding period. This would hold if we are in
the midst of the punishment phase or if a deviation by i to this action is what initiated
phase IIi. In this case, following the equilibrium strategies gives i a payoﬀ of at least
(1 − δn)


















Note that this is exactly εn larger than the expression in equation (8). If i deviated
and then returned to the equilibrium strategies, his payoﬀ would be no greater than the
expression in equation (9). Since we already showed that the expression in (8) exceeds
the expression in (9) for all suﬃciently large n, obviously something which is εn larger
will exceed it as well. Hence for all n suﬃciently large, i has no proﬁtable deviation on
such a history. This concludes the analysis of player i in phase IIi.
So consider any player j  = i in phase IIi. Suppose that this player must switch
actions in the current period and again in the next. If all players follow the equilibrium
strategies, then this is the largest number of times j will have to switch actions during
this phase, so this is the worst case scenario for j. In this case, following the equilibrium
path gives j a payoﬀ no worse than









As n →∞ , this converges to ˆ ui
j.I f i n s t e a d j were to deviate, his payoﬀ would be no
larger the bigger of
(1 − δn)max











(1 − δn)(1 + δn)max










To see this, note that there are two possibilities after the deviation: either j’s deviation
is one of his maxmin actions or it is not. If it is one of his maxmin actions, then he will
not have to change actions again, but will begin earning wj in the next period. The ﬁrst
expression gives an upper bound on his payoﬀ in this case. If the deviation action is not
one of his maxmin actions, he will not get wj until two periods later, but will have to




j > ˆ u
j
j,s oj does not wish to deviate for all n suﬃciently large.
Note that our argument for all the phase IIi’s together implicitly involves ﬁnitely
many inequalities. To see this, note that we certainly do not need more inequalities than
one for each player who is being punished, each phase in which the deviation leading to
punishment occurred, each of the ﬁnitely many possible periods of the cycle at which it
occurred, each of the ﬁnitely many actions the deviator may have chosen, each player
who might now deviate, each of the ﬁnitely many periods of punishment in which he
might deviate, and each of the ﬁnitely many deviation actions he might choose.
Now consider any history in phase IIIi. Suppose there are k periods left in the cycle.
Consider any player j  = i. From the same reasoning as above, we know that as n →∞ ,
j’s payoﬀ to following the equilibrium must converge to ˆ ui
j. The upper bound on j’s
payoﬀ constructed in the analysis of deviations by j in phase IIi apply here as well, so




j > ˆ u
j
j, j does not gain by deviating for any suﬃciently large n.
Finally, consider player i.L e tˆ ui(n)d e n o t ei’s continuation payoﬀ to following the
equilibrium. If i deviates, his payoﬀ is less than or equal to
(1 − δn)(1 + δn)max








To see this, recall that a deviation by i within phase IIIi l e a d st oam o v et op h a s eI I i
followed by a return to the previous point in the cycle. Note that the only way that i
might have to switch in the current period on the equilibrium path but avoid the switch in
returning to this point after phase IIi is if he is currently supposed to change to a maxmin
action but does not. In this case, though, i will have to change actions after the deviation,
a cost which is omitted from the above expression and is earlier (and so discounted less)
than the one mistakenly attributed to him in ˆ ui(n). Hence this expression is a valid lower
bound even in that circumstance. Hence i does not have a proﬁtable deviation if
ˆ ui(n)(1 − δ
Mi+1
n ) > (1 − δn)(1 + δn)max
































34which is required by our deﬁnition of Mi. Hence for all n suﬃciently large, i does not
have a proﬁtable deviation.
Note that our argument for phase IIIi implicitly involves ﬁnitely many inequalities,
since we certainly do not need more than one for each of the phases, each player who
might deviate, each of the ﬁnitely many periods in the cycle in which he might deviate,
and each possible deviation action.
Summarizing, then, we have a ﬁnite set of inequalities. For each, there is an ¯ n such
that the inequality holds for all n ≥ ¯ n. Letting ˆ n denote the largest of these ﬁnitely many
¯ n’s, we see that all the inequalities hold for n ≥ ˆ n. Hence for n ≥ ˆ n, these strategies
form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
B Proof of Theorem 3
This result is a corollary to Theorem 4. To see this, ﬁx any payoﬀ u ∈ F ∗ ∩ W.F i x
a sequence of strictly positive numbers η  converging to 0. For each η ,T h e o r e m4
establishes that there is a k  and a ¯ u( )w i t h i nη  of u such that
¯ u( ) ∈ lim
ε↓0,δ↑1
k  U(ε,δ).
In other words, for each  , there is a sequence (ε 
n,δ 
n)c o n v e r g i n gt o( 0 ,1) with εn/(1 −
δn) → ¯ k  and a sequence un( ) such that un( ) ∈U (ε 
n,δ 
n)a n dun( ) converges to ¯ u( )
within η of u.
So deﬁne a new sequence (ˆ εn, ˆ δn) such that (ˆ εn, ˆ δn)=( εn
n,δn
n). Let ˆ un = un(n). Then




C Proof of Theorem 5
The key step in the proof is
Lemma 6 Fix any η>0 and any k. Then for all u =( u1,...,u I) ∈ F ∩ W,t h e r ei s
a ﬁnite cycle of action proﬁles such that for any sequence (εn,δ n) → (0,1) with εn/(1 −
δn) → k,t h ep a y o ﬀt oi along this sequence converges as n →∞to within η of ui.
35Proof. The key diﬀerence between this lemma and Lemma 5 is that we require u ∈ F ∩W
instead of F ∗ ∩ W and allow for arbitrary k. To see that this is possible, ﬁx any η and
any k.F i xa n yu ∈ F ∩ W. By deﬁnition, u ∈ F implies that there exists a probability





It is easy to modify the argument in Lemma 5 to show that we can ﬁnd integers ca ≥ 0




   










   


















Construct a cycle as follows. Fix any order over the action proﬁles a which have
ca > 0. The players then play the action proﬁles in this sequence where proﬁle a is
played for caL periods. After this, the cycle starts over. The length of the cycle, then, is
 
a caL = CL. Hence the relative frequency with which a is played is caL/CL = ca/C.
We cannot say exactly how many times player i changes actions over the course of the
cycle. However, it is certainly fewer than A times since this is the number of action
proﬁles. Let Zi be the number of times i changes actions. Obviously, i’s payoﬀ over this


























   
















   










To complete the proof, simply construct strategies exactly as in the proof of Theorem
4. The only condition on k used in that part of the proof of Theorem 4 was k>
2max i[maxa∈A ui(a) − wi], which holds by assumption.
36D Proof of Theorem 6
We ﬁrst show that ˆ u ∈ c(U≥) ∩ W ⊆ limε↓0 U∞(ε). So ﬁx any ˆ u ∈ c(U≥) ∩ W.B y
deﬁnition, ˆ u ≥ w. Also, there are action proﬁles, say a1,...,a Z, and strictly positive
numbers α1,...,α Z such that u(az) ≥ w for all z,
 Z
z=1 αz =1 ,a n dˆ u ≤
 
z αzu(az).
Without loss of generality, assume Z = 1. Once we prove the result for this case, the
fact that we allow public randomizations extends the result to larger Z.
Fix an ε>0, smaller than any possible payoﬀ diﬀerence. That is, choose ε so that
ε<min
i min





Rewardability implies that there is no player whose payoﬀ is constant over all u ∈ u(A).
Hence the right–hand side is strictly positive, so this is possible.
For each i,l e tci denote the largest nonnegative integer such that ui(a1) − ciε ≥ ˆ ui.
Since ui(a1) ≥ ˆ ui, ci is well–deﬁned. Let u 
i denote ui(a1) − ciε evaluated at this largest
ci.N o t et h a tci and thus u  are functions of ε, though we omit this dependence in the
notation. Clearly, as ε ↓ 0, u  → ˆ u. In light of this, we show that u  ∈U (ε,1) for all
suﬃciently small ε, thus demonstrating ˆ u ∈ limε↓0 U(ε,1).
To show this, construct strategies as follows. In the ﬁrst period, if ci is even (where
0 is treated as even), player i plays a1
i. Otherwise, he plays any other action. For the
next several periods, each player changes between a1
i and any other action, concluding
when he has changed actions ci times. At this point, by construction, he will be back to
a1
i. Once all players have completed this phase, no player changes actions again, so a1 is
played forever after. It is easy to see that the payoﬀs if there are no deviations are u .
To complete the speciﬁcation of the strategies, we need to specify what happens in
response to a deviation. Let ¯ u be the equally weighted average of the payoﬀ vectors in







Our rewardability assumption implies that ¯ u   w.
For simplicity, we describe behavior at the out of equilibrium histories in terms of a
number of diﬀerent punishment modes. There is one punishment mode for each player
and each action available to that player. So we refer to a typical punishment mode as
the (i,ai) punishment mode where ai ∈ Ai. In punishment mode (i,ai), i is the target of
the punishment and ai is the action he played which started this punishment mode.
We go to punishment mode (i,ai)i fi is the ﬁrst player to deviate from the equilibrium
37play above and deviates by playing ai when he is supposed to play something diﬀerent.
(We ignore multiple simultaneous deviations throughout. Any speciﬁcation of a subgame
equilibrium will suﬃce for these histories.) If some player j (which may equal i)d e v i a t e s
while we are in punishment mode for i by playing action aj when he is not supposed to,
we move to punishment mode (j,aj).
In the ﬁrst period of punishment mode (i,ai), all players other than i (the target) go
to the actions which minimize the target’s payoﬀ under the hypothesis that the target
plays the same action he played in the previous period. There is a number κi of times
that the target is supposed to change actions, independent of ai.A sl o n ga st h et a r g e t
continues to change actions, the other players do not change their actions. If the target
stops changing before he has changed κi times and the last action played is a 
i,w em o v e
to punishment mode (i,a 
i). In particular, then, the other players move to the actions
which minimize the target’s payoﬀ from a 
i and the changes of action must begin again.
The exact sequence of actions used by the target while changing actions is unimportant
with two exceptions. First, the target’s strategy is to change actions κi times without
stopping. Second, κi will be even and the sequence must have the property that the
target concludes the sequence by returning to ai. Any action which does not deviate
from these requirements does not count as a deviation.
Punishment mode (i,ai) is completed once the target has changed actions κi times.
The continuation is then determined by the outcome of a publicly observed randomization
to pick a vector from U≥. For any player i,l e tui denote any u ∈ U≥ which minimizes ui
subject over U≥. The public randomization after punishment mode (i,ai) puts probability
qi(ai)o nui and with probability 1 − qi(ai) chooses uniformly from (all of) U≥.W h e n
the outcome of this randomization is observed, all agents change actions (if need be) to
move to any action proﬁle generating the selected payoﬀ vector and never change actions
again.
For the computation of κi and qi(ai), we need some more notation. Let pi(ai)d e n o t e
the probability that i will have to change actions again when the randomization is ob-
served given that the randomization is uniform on U≥.T h a ti s ,pi(ai) is the probability
that ai is diﬀerent from the action i plays in a uniformly drawn proﬁle from U≥. (Recall
that κi is even and the target must end up at ai at the end of his κi changes of action.)
Also, let Ii(ai)=0i fai is one of i’s maxmin actions and 1 otherwise. Similarly, let Ii(ai)
be 0 if ai i st h es a m ea c t i o ni plays at ui in equilibrium and 1 otherwise.
Let βi be the smallest integer b such that bε ≥ ui
i − wi.N o t et h a tui
i ≥ wi,s ot h i si s
well deﬁned. Let κi equal the smallest even integer greater than or equal to
βi +1+2m a x
i,j|i =j
¯ ui − ui
i +1
¯ uj − wj
.
38Note that ¯ u   w implies that κi is well deﬁned. Set qi(ai)s ot h a t
1 − qi(ai)=
κiε + wi − ui
i +[ Ii(ai) − Ii(ai)]ε
¯ ui − ui
i +[ Ii(ai) − pi(ai)]ε
.
By construction, κiε>u i
i − wi + ε, so the numerator is at least
ε +[ Ii(ai) − Ii(ai)]ε ≥ 0.
For ε suﬃciently small, the denominator must be strictly positive as well since ¯ ui >u i
i.
Finally, as ε goes to zero, the fraction converges to 0, so it must be less than 1 for small
enough ε. Hence qi(ai) is well deﬁned for ε suﬃciently small.
The key fact to note about this choice of qi(ai)i st h a ti te n s u r e st h a tt h et a r g e ti s
indiﬀerent between following the equilibrium punishment and not. To see this, note that
the target’s expected payoﬀ to following the equilibrium punishment is
qi(ai)[u
i




i − Ii(ai)ε − κiε +[ 1− qi(ai)]
 
¯ ui − u
i
i +[ Ii(ai) − pi(ai)]ε
 
.
Substituting for 1 − qi(ai)f r o mt h ea b o v eg i v e s
u
i
i − Ii(ai)ε − κiε + κiε + wi − u
i
i +[ Ii(ai) − Ii(ai)]ε = wi − Ii(ai)ε.
Suppose that i does not follow the equilibrium punishment. What is the best al-
ternative? Clearly, i can either not change actions ever again or change to one of his
maxmin actions (if he is not already playing one) and never change again. If ai is a
maxmin action, staying at this action is the best alternative to following the equilibrium
punishment. This would give him a payoﬀ of wi. So suppose ai is not one of i’s maxmin
actions. Let zi denote i’s second best payoﬀ when the others are trying to minmax him.
In other words, letting A∗
i denote i’s set of maxmin action, deﬁne









By hypothesis, ai ∈ Ai\A∗
i,s oA∗
i  = Ai. Hence zi is well–deﬁned. Clearly, wi >z i.G i v e n
that ε is chosen to satisfy (10), wi − zi >ε .I fi never changes actions again, his payoﬀ
is zi at best. If he changes to one of his maxmin actions, his payoﬀ is wi − ε. Clearly,
then, it is optimal for him to change to one of his maxmin actions. In short, i’s payoﬀ if
he does not follow the equilibrium punishment is wi minus the switching cost if he is not
already playing one of his maxmin actions, or wi − Ii(ai)ε.S o i is indiﬀerent between
39following the equilibrium punishment and not. In short, the target of a punishment has
no incentive to deviate prior to the random determination of u.
To complete the proof that this is a subgame perfect equilibrium, consider any history
for which there has been no deviation and any player i.I fi does not deviate, his payoﬀ
will be at least u 
i (more if he has already carried out some changes of action). If i
deviates, his expected payoﬀ will be wi at best. Since u  ≥ u ≥ w, i has no incentive to
deviate.
Consider any history which puts us in punishment mode (i,ai)a n da n yj  = i.D o e s
j have an incentive to deviate prior to the realization of the public randomization deter-
mining u?I fj does not deviate, his payoﬀ is at least
qi(ai)u
i
j +[ 1− qi(ai)]¯ uj − 2ε.
(This would be the case if j has to switch actions at this point to punish the target and
will have to switch again once u is realized.) If j deviates, his payoﬀ will be wj at best.
Because ui
j ≥ wj, a suﬃcient condition for j to not deviate is
qi(ai)wj +[ 1− qi(ai)]¯ uj − 2ε ≥ wj
or [¯ uj − wj][1 − qi(ai)] ≥ 2ε. From the deﬁnition of qi(ai) above, we see that a suﬃcient
condition for this for ε ≤ 1i s
[¯ uj − wj]
κiε + wi − ui
i − ε
¯ ui − ui
i +1
≥ 2ε.
From the deﬁnition of κi,
κiε ≥ u
i
i − wi + ε +2 ε
¯ ui − ui
i +1
¯ uj − wj
.
Hence a suﬃcient condition is
¯ uj − wj
¯ ui − ui
i +1
2ε
¯ ui − ui
i +1
¯ uj − wj
≥ 2ε,
which is obviously true. Hence no player, the target or otherwise, will deviate from a
punishment prior to the realization of the public randomization.
Hence it only remains to show that no player will deviate after the realization of the
randomization. Consider any player i who played ai in the period before the realization
and suppose u =( u1,...,u I) is the realization of the randomization. If i deviates from
the equilibrium by playing ˆ ai,w em o v ei n t oa n( i,ˆ ai) punishment mode and i’s payoﬀ is
wi−Ii(ˆ ai)ε minus ε if ˆ ai  = ai.I f ,i n s t e a d ,i follows the equilibrium, his payoﬀ is ui minus
40ε if he must switch actions. Recall that ui ≥ wi. First, suppose ui >w i. By (10), then,
ui −ε>w i. Hence i has no incentive to deviate since the worst he could do by following
the equilibrium is strictly better than the best he could do by deviating. Suppose, then,
that ui = wi.T h e ni’s payoﬀ from following the equilibrium is wi − Ii(ai)ε.I fˆ ai = ai,
this is exactly what i would get if he deviated. If ˆ ai  = ai,t h e ni’s payoﬀ to deviating is
−ε + wi − Ii(ˆ ai)ε ≤ wi − ε ≤ wi − Ii(ai)ε.
Hence either way, i has no incentive to deviate.
This demonstrates that c(U≥) ∩ W ⊆ limε↓0 U∞(ε). To complete the proof, then,
suppose u/ ∈ c(U≥) ∩ W. We now show that there is no equilibrium payoﬀ nearby. Since
c(U≥) ∩ W is closed and does not contain u, for every suﬃciently small ε>0 and every
u  within ε of u,w eh a v eu  / ∈ c(U≥)∩W.C h o o s ea n ys u c hε which is small enough that
ε<w i − ui(a)
for all a and i such that ui(a) <w i. Suppose, contrary to our claim, that there is a u 
within ε of u with u  ∈U ∞(ε). Fix such a u  and the equilibrium generating this payoﬀ.
Obviously, we must have u  ∈ W as any player i can guarantee himself a payoﬀ of
wi from a constant action. Hence the fact that u  / ∈ c(U≥) ∩ W implies that u  / ∈ c(U≥).
Hence there is some action proﬁle ˆ a with ui(ˆ a) <w i which is played inﬁnitely often with
strictly positive probability.
Let P denote the set of paths (inﬁnite sequences of action proﬁles) in the support
of the equilibrium which generates payoﬀ u .L e tµ denote the probability distribution
over P induced by the equilibrium (including the eﬀect of the public randomizations if
strategies are based on these). Let P∗(a)d e n o t et h es e to fp a t h si nP which eventually




2,...) ∈P|∃ T such that a
t = a, ∀t ≥ T}.
Similarly, let Pd denote the set of paths in P which do not absorb — that is, Pd =
P\∪ a∈AP∗(a). It is not hard to see that µ(Pd) = 0. If this were not zero, then the
expected total switching costs of the players would necessarily be inﬁnite, meaning that
some player’s payoﬀ is −∞, so obviously his strategy cannot be optimal.
Our selection of ˆ a implies that µ(P∗(ˆ a)) > 0. Recall that we chose ˆ a to be some
proﬁle played inﬁnitely often with strictly positive probability. Since no path in P∗(a)
for a  =ˆ a has this property and since
 
a∈A µ(P∗(a)) = 1, we must have µ(P∗(ˆ a)) > 0.
Let Pt(a) denote the set of paths in P with at = a. For any path p ∈P ∗(a), a  =ˆ a,
there is a T such that p/ ∈P t(ˆ a) for all t ≥ T. That is, if a path eventually stays at a  =ˆ a




as t →∞ . On the other hand, consider any p ∈P ∗(ˆ a). By deﬁnition, there is a T such
that this path has at =ˆ a for all t ≥ T. Hence there is a T such that this path is in Pt(ˆ a)





as t →∞ .




µ(P∗(ˆ a) ∩P t(ˆ a))
µ(Pt(ˆ a))
.
Since all the P∗(a) sets are disjoint and their union has probability 1, we can rewrite this
as
µ(P∗(ˆ a) ∩P t(ˆ a))
 
a∈A µ(P∗(a) ∩P t(ˆ a))
.




(Note that this is well deﬁned since µ(P∗(ˆ a)) > 0.) In short, µ(P∗(ˆ a) |P t(ˆ a)) → 1a s
t →∞ .
Consider player i, the player for whom ui(ˆ a) <w i.F i xa n yt for which ˆ a is played at
t with positive probability in the equilibrium. Consider the following strategy for player
i: follow the equilibrium strategy until the equilibrium strategies call for ˆ a to be played
at period t. Then deviate to one of the maxmin actions forever after. Clearly, since
the original strategies form an equilibrium, this alternative strategy cannot be better for
i for any choice of t. In comparing i’s payoﬀ in the equilibrium to i’s payoﬀ from the
alternative strategy, obviously, we can condition on the set of paths for which ˆ a is played
at time t — for any other paths, the payoﬀ diﬀerence is zero. If player i deviates at
time t as speciﬁed, his expected payoﬀ from that point onward is at least wi − ε.B u t
as t →∞ ,p l a y e ri’s expected continuation payoﬀ if he does not deviate is converging to
ui(ˆ a). Since ui(ˆ a) <w i−ε, there is some large t for which i strictly prefers the deviation,
a contradiction.
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